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Domestic TERRORISM in the Islamic Legal Tradition

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  • Domestic TERRORISM in the Islamic Legal Tradition

    Domestic terrorism in the Islamic legal tradition

    By Dr. Abdul Hakim Sherman Jackson
    Attached Files

    Wahhabis Refuted

  • #2
    Domestic terrorism in the Islamic legal tradition

    Author: Jackson, Sherman A. Source: Muslim World (Hartford, Conn.) v. 91 no3/4 (Fall 2001) p. 293-310 ISSN: 0027-4909 Number: BHUM02001377 Copyright: The magazine publisher is the copyright holder of this article and it is reproduced with permission. Further reproduction of this article in violation of the copyright is prohibited. To contact the publisher:

    Close examination of the classical Islamic law of hirabah, however, reveals that this law corresponds in its most salient features to domestic terrorism in the American legal system. This holds despite a number of important differences between hirabah and domestic terrorism. First, the importance of the political motivations of would-be terrorists appears to be inversely proportional in the two systems. Whereas the pursuit of political aims tends to heighten or perhaps establish the correspondence between publicly directed violence and terrorism in American law, in Islamic law it tends to have the opposite effect. In other words, to the extent that a group declares itself or is deemed by the government to be acting in pursuit of political objectives (and the assumption here is that these are grounded in some interpretation of religion), their activity is actually less likely to fall under the law of hirabah. Second, the importance attached to numbers appears to be inversely proportional in the two systems. Under Islamic law, the greater the number of individuals involved in a prima facie act of terrorism, the less likely to fall under the laws of hirabah. By comparison, according to FBI guidelines issued in 1983, a terrorism investigation may not even be initiated unless circumstances indicate that two or more persons are involved in an offense.(FN6) Third, hirabah, at least in its fully developed form, appears to be potentially a much broader category than terrorism proper, covering as it does a spectrum of crimes ranging from breaking and entering to "hate crimes" to rape to terrorism proper. Here, however, given the broad range of criminal statutes under which most terrorists are prosecuted in the United States, this difference may turn out to be more apparent than it is real. Indeed, few terrorists are actually tried in America for bona fide acts of terrorism per se. Instead, they are usually pursued and prosecuted on charges having to do with trafficking in or possessing illegal weapons, money-laundering, or attempts to conceal and/or falsify identity. (FN7) Finally, whereas American law appears to target terrorism that is directed toward the realization of goals that lie beyond acts of violence themselves, Islamic law punishes terrorism, period, be it directed beyond or merely coincidental to the occurrence of a violent or heinous act.


    The obvious starting point in any attempt to establish correspondence between terrorism and hirahah is with the definitions of these terms. In the United States, the agency charged with investigating real and suspected instances of terrorism is the FBI, which defines terrorism as, ... the unlawful use of force or violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political goals.(FN8).

    A prominent, if not essential, ingredient of this definition is clearly its focus on intimidation, i.e. the desire to induce and/or spread fear.(FN9) This fear, however, is not merely coincidental to the occurrence of heinous acts but is directed toward the realization of goals that lie beyond the acts themselves. This is in fact what distinguishes an act of terrorism--e.g. the 1996 bombing of the Federal Building in Oklahoma--from a random act of violence, such as the shooting at Columbine High School in Littleton, Colorado.(FN10) While both of these acts engendered widespread public fear, the bombing of the Federal Building appeared to be directed at a target beyond its immediate victims. The United States government, in other words, or society at large, was being called upon to implement certain changes, in the absence of which society could expect more violent action. In this context, adherence to the status quo, or life as we know it, came to represent an imminent threat to everyone's safety. It is this kind of intimidation or spreading of fear that lies at the heart of terrorism in American law.

    The element of helplessness provides the basis for a number of interesting modifications in Islamic criminal law. For example, under the law of intentional homicide (qisas), the general rule, accepted by all but the Hanafis, is that the murder of a non-Muslim by a Muslim is a civil offense for which the family of the victim can only demand blood money, not execution, as would be the case if the victim was a Muslim. A number of jurists insisted, however, that in some instances such murders constitute acts of hirabah for which the Muslim perpetrators are to be executed. Now, what qualifies such a murder as an act of hirabah appears to be the lack of any personal relationship between the parties, such that the victim might either be able to reconcile with or to avoid persons with whom he has antagonistic relationships. In other words, the fact that the Jewish or Christian victim does not know his killer implies that the killer targeted not simply this Jew or this Christian but rather any Jew or any Christian. As such, no Jew and no Christian would be safe, because they could not take any security measures against such an equal opportunity killer. Thus, we find even the reputedly puritanical Ibn Taymiya, his polemical theological writings against Jews and Christians notwithstanding, insisting that the strongest opinion among those espoused by the jurists was that the Muslim murderer in such cases must be executed--as a duty, incidentally, upon the authorities, not at the behest of the victim's family--"because," according to him, "this is a crime against the public at large (li annahu qatala li al-fasad al-'amm)."(FN22) Similarly, a number of later Maliki jurists, e.g. al-Dardir, al-Sawi, imply that if a Muslim forcibly enters a non-Muslim's house and the latter ends up killing him in defense of his property and/or the honor of his family, such a killing would be treated essentially as an act of "self-defense."(FN23).

    In most if not all of these depictions, the money-taking motive appears to lurk in the background as a consideration alongside the spread of fear and helplessness in judging acts as constituting instances of hirabah. From this perspective, the definitions and elaborations cited appear to be more suggestive of something along the lines of armed robbery, banditry or extortion than they are of terrorism per se. Closer examination reveals, however, that while the money-taking motive is clearly a consideration, this is simply because money-taking was the most commonly assumed reason for why individuals engage in acts of hirabah, not because money-taking was itself a sine qua non. The sine qua non of hirabah was, again, the spreading of fear and helplessness. This is most clearly manifested among Maliki jurists (especially later Maliki jurists) in the distinction they draw between hirabah and ghasb (unlawful appropriation).

    In his al-Sharh al-saghir, Ahmad al-Dardir (d.1201/1786) cites the definition of ghasb given by Ibn al-Hajib (d.646/1248) as the going definition in the Maliki madhhab. According to this definition, ghasb consists of: forcibly and wrongfully taking another's money without engaging in hirabah (akhu mal qahran ta 'adiyan bi la hirabah).(FN24) Al-Dardir points out that this definition is actually defective inasmuch as it relies upon prior knowledge of the definition of hirabah. He notes, however, that this deficiency can be easily overcome by substituting "without inspiring fear of being killed (bi la khawfi qatlin)" for "without engaging in hirabah." In other words, hirabah is distinguished from ghasb not by the element of taking money but by the element of inspiring fear for one's life. This fear, however, goes beyond the immediate victim (who is obviously afraid and for that reason gives up his money) and has the effect of discouraging others from undertaking their normal course of activity, again, out of fear for their lives. This is clearly brought out in another manual by al-Dardir, al-Sharh alkabir, wherein he states that if the victim of such robberies has immediate access to people who could come to his rescue, then the act of taking his money would not constitute an act of hirabah but an act of ghasb.(FN25) In other words, the presence of people to come to his aid both precludes the spreading of fear and preempts the occurrence of helplessness, both of these being essential elements that define hirabah and set it apart from ghasb, which, incidentally, carries only discretionary sanctions, as opposed to the harsh mandatory punishments for hirabah.

    One who engages in hirabah is one who terrorizes the streets (akhafa al-tariq) in order to prevent people from freely traveling them. That is to say, it is anyone who terrorizes the people in the streets in such a way that prevents them from freely traveling them and from enjoying the benefit thereof, even if he does not aim to take their money but rather only to prevent them from enjoying the benefit of freely traveling the streets...(FN28).

    As with other authorities mentioned, al-Dasuqi goes on to apply this notion of spreading fear and helplessness to any situation in which individuals are rendered helpless. This brings him to endorse the controversial principle to the effect that all acts of murder committed by stealth, e.g. poisoning, drugging (and, by extension, more modern activities such as carbombings), fall under the law of hirabah.(FN29) To be sure, these jurists all recognized how problematic and dangerous such a broad construction of hirabah could be. Thus, we find them laying down all kinds of riders and qualifiers that would set hirabah off from more routine acts of theft, robbery, pilferage, murder and the like. In the end, however, hirabah assumes its place as an effective super-category hovering above the entire criminal law as a possible remedy to be pressed into service for the more sensational, heinous or terrifying manifestations of these and other crimes. In this capacity, hirabah appears, again, to parallel the function of terrorism as an American legal category. Its function is not so much to define specific crimes but to provide a mechanism for heightening the scrutiny and/or level of pursuit and prosecution in certain cases of actual or potential public violence.(FN30).

    In sum, we may conclude that it is terror, or the spreading of fear and helplessness, that lies at the heart of hirabah. From this perspective, hirabah speaks to the same basic issue as does terrorism in American law. As mentioned earlier, however, hirabah actually goes beyond the FBI definition of terrorism, inasmuch as hirabah covers both directed and coincidental spreading of fear. Thus, for example, both the bombing of the Federal Building in Oklahoma and the shooting at Columbine High School in Colorado would fall under the law of hirabah. So too would the 1999 shooting at the Jewish community center in California(FN31) and the 1998 sniper assassination of the abortion doctor inside his New York home.(FN32).


    Hirabah, it turns out, is the most severely punished crime in Islam, carrying mandatory criminal sanctions (hudud/s. hadd). A typical explanation for the severity of these sanctions is given by the 7th/13th century Spanish Maliki jurist, Muhammad b. Ahmad al-Qurtubi, who writes,.

    Hirabah is extremely detrimental because it prevents people from being able to earn a living. For, indeed, commerce is the greatest and most common means of earning a living, and people must be able to move about in order to engage in commerce... But when the streets are terrorized (ukhifa), people stop traveling and are forced to stay at home. The doors to commerce are closed and people are unable to earn a living. Thus, God instituted the severest punishments for hirabah as a means of humiliating and discouraging the perpetrators thereof and in order to keep the doors of business open.(FN33).

    The severest punishments to which al-Qurtubi refers are explicitly outlined in Qur'an, 5:33-34, virtually the beginning and end of all juristic discussions on hirabah.

    Verily the recompense for those who wage war against God and His Messenger and strive to spread corruption in the land is that they be executed or crucified or that their hands and feet be amputated from opposite sides or that they be banished from the earth. That is for them a humiliation in this life, and in the Next Life they shall receive a grievous chastisement. Except for those who repent before you are able to subdue them. And know that God is Forgiving, and Merciful.

    These punishments are quite straightforward, as a result of which the jurists display a great deal of unanimity in their interpretations of these verses. Still, there were disagreements. The first of these was over the meaning of "or" ("aw" in Arabic) that separates these punishments from each other. The majority, the Hanafis, Shafis and Hanbalis, held that "or" implied a kind of ascending order (tartib) commensurate with the particulars attending the act of hirabah. If the terrorists killed people without taking any money, they were only subject to execution; if they killed people and took money, they were subject to execution and crucifixion (in that order, according to some; in the reverse, according to others); if they did not kill but only took money, they were subject to having their right hand and left foot amputated; and if they neither killed nor took money, they were only subject to exile, some, like the early Hanafis, interpreting this to refer to imprisonment.(FN34).

    The big dissenters on this question were the Malikis, who, in cases that did not involve killing, left the choice of punishment entirely to the discretion of the authorities. In the Maliki view, one guilty of hirabah could be executed or crucified even if they neither killed nor took money. Their reasoning was that the spreading of fear, helplessness and a host of other evils could result from an act of hirabah that involved no killing or robbery. Indeed, Malik himself is on record as having once remarked that "Many a one is there who commits hirabah who does not kill but who spreads more fear (huwa akhwaf) and is more detrimental to society in the fear that he spreads (a'zamu fasadan fi khawfih) than one who actually kills people."(FN35).

    A second disagreement arose over the amount of property a terrorist would have to take in order to be subject to amputation. According to the law of theft, the property stolen by a thief must exceed a certain value (nisab, i.e. 1/4 dinar, or about $16.94, according to my calculations) in order for the thief to be subject to punishment for theft. The question then arose as to whether this logic should extend to the law of hirabah. The Shafi'is,(FN36) Hanabalis(FN37) and a majority of Hanafis (with some qualifications)(FN38) held that it did. The Malikis held that it did not, and for them, one guilty of hirabah was subject to amputation regardless of the value of the property taken.

    On the question of repentance and their interpretation of the verse "Except those who repent before you are able to subdue them," all of the schools agree that if one repented before being apprehended, e.g. by turning oneself in and displaying plain indications of a change of heart, the mandatory criminal sanctions (execution, crucifixion, amputation and exile) were to be dropped, as "rights of God (haqq Allab); And know that God is Forgiving, Merciful." Civil liability (haqq al-adami), however, the right of a victim's family to demand execution or reimbursement for stolen or damaged property, could not be set aside.(FN41).

    These were some of the most important differences regarding the punishments for hirabah discussed by classical jurists and their heirs.


    There were essentially two major considerations on the basis of which an act of hirabah was to be distinguished from an act of baghy, or rebellion. It is in light of the considerations I stated earlier that the significance attached to numbers and the political motivations of would-be terrorists appears to be inversely proportional in Islamic and American laws of terrorism.

    The second stipulation was that the rebels be backed by a sufficient level of force (shawkah), measured mainly in numbers and military preparedness.(FN45) The jurists differed on this number. The 7th/13th century al-Qarafi notes that a number of jurists placed it at ten; but he of all people would admit that this was a question of fact, not law, and that this number could increase or decrease, depending on the jurists' and/or the authorities' assessment of the situation.(FN46) This stipulation has the effect of reserving the more lenient law of rebellion for the most serious and widespread cases of public disaffection. That is to say, the gieivances that allegedly prompt a group to rebel must be serious and widespread enough to enlist the support of significant numbers of people. Otherwise, small groups of extremists, sophomoric idealists, prurient bandits or terrorists will be denied the refuge afforded by the law of rebellion and be treated under the more severe and salutary law of hirabah.


    But Rida's view did not have the immediate effect of displacing the traditional view. Rather, it would contribute to a phenomenon, quite common in Islamic law, of old and new views running parallel to each other as proponents of each jockeyed to establish theirs as the dominant

    To be sure, Qutb's views were not without precedent in the early history of Islamic jurisprudence (though he himself seems not to have relied on this). Indeed, a number of early jurists had associated hirabah with the activities of groups who had formally apostatized and resorted to violence in an attempt to overthrow the Islamic social and political order.(FN60) The classical jurists, however, as we have seen, would reject this restriction and construct a law of hirabah that would include non-apostate terrorists, on the one hand, and exclude non-apostate rebels, on the other, providing in the case of the latter an alternative to complete annihilation. Ironically, it would be precisely those modern secularizing forces which equated their success with their ability to marginalize traditional legal authorities (whom they saw as standing in the way of progress) who would create the space in which views like Qutb's would ultimately gain currency, particularly among young, ideologically hungry and economically disenfranchised segments of the population.


    Throughout Islamic history, Muslim jurists showed themselves to be keenly interested in protecting the community from those within its midst who seek to bring it harm through violence and terror. Early on they would turn to Qur'an 5:33-34 to provide them with the means to develop legal constructs that served this interest. The law of hirabah was the result of this effort. Far from a stagnant construct, however, hirabah turned out to be an extremely malleable category, capable of assuming many different forms under many different circumstances. Indeed, the many features and different applications of the law of hirabah show themselves to have been just as indebted to historical experience and the creative acumen of jurists as they were to dictates of scripture. At bottom, however, the primary concern remained essentially the same as that governing discussions of terrorism in American law: protecting the community against publicly directed violence. Even the modern revisionist approaches would not completely abandon this interest. Viewed from this perspective, we can see a clear cognate relationship between terrorism in American law and hirabah in Islam. Such recognition should encourage a more informed comparison between Islamic and American legal approaches. At the very least, such an exploration could deepen our confidence in the ability of the two systems to speak to and understand each other. At most, it might point the way to possible avenues of cooperation in a mutually shared interest in a safer, better world.

    Wahhabis Refuted


    • #3

      2. Walter Laqueur, The Terrorism Reader (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1978), 1-2, notes that discussions on terrorist theory and practice go back at least as far as the 1880s and 1890s. These, however, appear to have been more along the lines of academic discussions, exerting little effect on public perception or legal discourse.

      3. See B.L. Smith, Terrorism in America (New York: State University of New York Press, 1994), 8.

      4. Ibid.

      6. Smith, Terrorism, 12.

      7. In fact, almost all of the offenses for which terrorists have been traditionally pursued and prosecuted can be subsumed under existing criminal laws and statutes. Among the most common of these are: 1) racketeering; 2) machine guns, destructive devices and other firearms; 3) conspiracy; 4) racketeering-influenced and corrupt organizations (RICO); 5) firearms; 6) explosive materials; 7) stolen property; 8) robbery and burglary; 9) international emergency economic powers; 10) treason, sedition and subversive activities; 11) mail fraud; 12) homicide; 12) fraud/false statements. See B.L. Smith, Terrorism, 162-63.

      8. Ibid., 6.

      9. See Benjamin Netanyahu, Terrorism: How the West Can Win (New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 1986), 9.

      10. On April 20, 1999, two students, Dylan Klebold (18 years old) and Eric Harris (17 years old) opened fire on their classmates at their high school, killing thirteen people and wounding several others. This constituted the worst act of violence to occur at an American school in U.S. history. See Newsweek (3 May, 1999): 22-31.

      12. Ala' al-Din Abu Bakr b. Masud al-Kasani, Bada'i, 9:360.

      15. Ibid., 10:303.

      16. Al-Majmu, 22:232.

      17. Ibid.; al-Mughni, 10:303.

      18. Al-Mughni, 10:303.

      19. Al-Nawawi, al-Majmu, 22:233. This view did not last. In fact, some eventually held that such violence inside cities where people are supposed to be safe was even more criminal in nature, since they bespoke a certain boldness and disregard for civil society. See, e.g. Ibn Taymiyah, Majmu fatawa ibn taymiyah, 28:315-16. Ibn Taymiyah adds, incidentally, that when people are robbed in their homes, they can be dispossessed of all their wealth, whereas people traveling in the desert usually only have a portion of their wealth with them.

      20. Ibid., 28:316.

      21. Al-Kasani, Bada'i, 9:361. Later Hanafis, e.g. al-Tahawi, opposed this view.

      23. Al-Sharh al-saghir, 2:404; Bulghat, 2:404. Islamic law does not explicitly recognize a formal category called "self-defense." But, as we see in the present case, this does not mean that the concept itself is not operative in the law. The Shafiis, for example, speak to the issue in some detail in a chapter on "aggression" (siyal). See, e.g. Shams al-Din Muhammad b. Ahmad al-Shirbini, al-Iqna fi hall alfaz abi shuja 2 vols. (in one) (Cairo: Mustafa al-Halabi, 1359/1940), 2:199-200.

      24. Al-Sharh al-saghir, 2:404; Bulghat, 2:209.

      25. Al-Sharh al-kabir (On the margin of al-Dasuqi's Hashiyat), 4:348.

      26. Ibid., (on the margin of Bulghat al-salik), 2:403.

      29. Hashiyat al-dasuqi, 4:349. All three authors make passing reference to "state terrorism," al-Sawi (and in his words, al-Dasuqi) even referring explicitly to "the tyrannical governors of Egypt, among others, who despoil the Muslims of their money, deny them their wages and attack their villages, while there is no one who could come to their assistance." See Bulghat, 2:404; Hashiyat al-dasuqi, 4:348.

      30. See above, note 7.

      31. On 10 August, 1999, Buford D. Furrow, an avowed white supremacist, opened fire at the North Valley Jewish Community Center in Granada Hills, CA, wounding three children, one teenager and an elderly receptionist. See, Newsweek (23 August, 1999): 23-25.

      32. On 26 October, 1998, an anti-abortion sniper shot through the window of the home of Dr. Bernett Slepion and killed him. See The New York Times, (27 October, 1998); B-5.

      33. Al-Qurtubi, al-Jami li ahkam al-qur'an 11 vols., ed. K. Mays (Beirut: Dar al-Fikr, 1419/1999), 3:88.

      34. Bada'i, 9:370-71.

      35. Al-Mudawwanah, 4:428.

      36. Al-Nawawi, al-Majmu', 22:233.

      37. Ibn Qudamah, al-Mughni, 10:212-13.

      38. Al-Kasani, Bada'i, 9:363.

      40. Al-Mawardi, al-Hawi, 13:363; Ibn Qudamah, 10:308; al-Mudawwanah, 4:430.

      41. Al-Nawawi, al-Majmu', 22:242-43; al-Kasani, Bada'i, 9:373-74; Ibn Qudamah, al-Mughni, 10:314-15; al-Dardir, al-Sharh al-saghir, 2:404-05.

      42. "If two parties of the faithful come to arms, reconcile between them. If, one of them then transgresses against the other, fight the one that transgresses until it returns to the command of God. If it returns, reconcile between them justly and be fair. Verily God loves those who are fair. Verily, the faithful are but a single brotherhood. So reconcile between your brothers, and be God-conscious, perhaps you might receive mercy.".

      43. See Khaled Abou El-Fadl, "Ahkam al-bughat," 153, 160.

      44. See Khaled Abou El-Fadl, "Ahkam al-bughat," 157-58.

      45. See Khaled Abou El-Fadl, "Ahkam al-bughat," 160.

      46. Al-Qarafi, al-Dhakhirah, 14 vols. (Beirut: Dar al-Gharb al-Islami, 1994), 12:6. Among pre-modern jurists, al-Qarafi was perhaps the most articulate and emphatic in insisting that jurists recognize the distinction between law and fact and that their own jurisdiction is, properly speaking, limited to questions of law (i.e. scriptural interpretation). It is for this reason that he would insist that the number of participants in a prima facie act of rebellion could go above or below ten, depending on the assessment of qualified determiners of fact. For more on this point, see my Islamic Law and the State: The Constitutional Jursiprudence of Shihab al-Din al-Qarafi (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1996), esp. 113-41.

      47. Tafsir al-manar, 12 vols. (Cairo: Dar al-Manar, 1376/1946), 6:366.

      48. Al-Manar, 6:358.

      50. Abolished were criminal sanctions for fornication and adultery, theft, wine drinking and defamation (qadhaf).

      51. On these and other developments, see NJ Coulson, A History of Islamic Law (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1964), 151-52ff.

      52. Islamic law never recognized a legislative branch of government. Rather, God was recognized as the only legislator, the shari', the function of the jurists being to interpret the law, the function of the state being to implement it. Since there was no legislative branch, there was no mechanism for striking laws from the books, even after the collective efforts of the jurists had settled on new interpretations. This led to a peculiar feature of Islamic law not unanalogous to what we find in America law, namely that laws that had been effectively rescinded remained 'on the books and retained their potential status as "good law" if they should ever be championed by the right authorities under the right circumstances. Failure to appreciate this fact has led to a number of lamentable instances of modern scholars (particularly those outside the field of Islamic legal studies) referring to authoritative manuals of Islamic law and citing views that may have constituted a school's going opinion at one time but had since been overridden by other views. This is particularly problematic given the common assumption that the older view must be the more "authentic," a bias that ignores the fact that Hanafi laws or Shafii law has always been whatever the generality of contemporary Hanafi and Shafii jurists say it is.

      53. Al-Tafsir al-wasit li al-qur'an al-karim, 30 vols. (Cairo: Dar al-Maarif, 1417/1996), 6:128.

      54. Al-Fiqh al-islami wa adillatuh, 9 vols. (Beirut: Dar al-Fikr, 1417/1996), 6:128.

      55. By non-jurist, I refer to the fact that he did not receive a traditional Islamic legal education. On another level, however, one might consider him a jurist inasmuch as he engages in the activity of legal interpretation, the results of which are recognized as authentic by large numbers of Muslims, including, perhaps, a number of jurists themselves. In this capacity, Qutb, perhaps better than any other modern Muslim thinker, symbolizes one of the distinguishing features of modern Islam, namely the renewal of the competition, dormant now for more than a millennium, over whose interpretive efforts the community will recognize as constituting the most authentic representation of the divine will.

      56. Sayyid Qutb, Fi zilal al-qur'an, 6 vols. (Beirut: Dar al-Shuruq, 1393/1973), 2:878.

      57. Zilal, 2:879.

      58. While Qutb makes no mention of it, later Maliki writers develop a similar doctrine to the effect that if legitimate authority is non-existent or known to be corrupt, an "upright party of Muslims (Jama'at al-Muslimin al-'Udul)" can be substituted as legitimate authority. This does not go as far as Qutb goes, inasmuch as it clearly recognizes the possibility of corrupt authority being legitimate. Still, it is a step in the direction of recognizing substitutes for state authority. Cf. my "Jama'at al-Muslimin al-'Udul: The Limits of Fiqh and Muslim Scriptural Hermeneutics in North America," unpublished paper delivered at the Association of Muslim Social Scientists conference in Chicago, IL, October, 1998.

      59. Zilal, 2:879.

      Wahhabis Refuted