Another stooge:
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''President Saleh's Careful Attempts to Retain Power in Yemen''
he U.S. Department of Treasury's recent indictment of Yemeni Sheik Abdul Majid al-Zindani on charges that include recruiting for and promoting al-Qaeda highlight the enormous challenges facing Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh as he attempts to help the United States fight Islamic militants. In addition to being widely respected throughout Yemen, Sheik Zindani has connections to many top leaders and has played a very important role in recent Yemeni history. His indictment, while the most extreme, is just another example of the historical maze Saleh has to work through to bring Yemen into the international community without facing a popular backlash and falling from power.

Yemen's Recent History

Politics in Yemen is a tough game. Saleh's two direct predecessors were both assassinated in gruesome circumstances (one was found in a hotel room surrounded by drugs and dead prostitutes; the other was killed in his office by an exploding briefcase). Coming to power in North Yemen in 1978, Saleh had to deal with tribes that valued their autonomy, powerful business interests, Saudi interference, and an enemy in the South -- the Marxist People's Democratic Republic of Yemen.

Saleh, with unexpected flair and diplomatic skill, survived and oversaw unification in 1990. But unification was not easy, as he and southern leaders maneuvered for power in the newly integrated state. The first parliamentary elections were held in 1993, in which Saleh's party, the General People's Congress (GPC), took a solid majority and the Yemeni Socialist Party finished third. It was here that politics in Yemen showed their new direction. The second-place finish went to the Yemen Reform Group, also known as Islah, an Islamic party.

There are a number of reasons for the Yemen Reform Group's strong finish. They managed to rally support in the more traditional and Islamic north by playing on fears of socialist secularization and disruption of tribal unity (both were planks of the Marxist south). Another factor was their leader, Sheik Abdullah al-Ahmar, the head of the Hashid tribal federation, the largest and most unified in Yemen. Indeed, President Saleh's tribe is a member of Hashid, which has led some observers and critics to charge collusion.

There is collusion between the GPC and Islah, but it has little to do with tribal relations. The role of tribes is important in Yemen, but it is not of paramount importance, especially for Saleh, whose tribe is urban and has few real connections to the rural Hashid tribes. Politics were more of a factor, as GPC and Islah both wanted to neutralize the reformed, and reformist, Marxists.

The upshot of the elections was the increased role of Islah. Sheik al-Ahmar, its leader, became chairman of the council of representatives, a position he still holds. Islah, as Yemeni scholar Paul Dresch points out, is not a radical Islamic party, but an Islamic party with some radical members. Al-Ahmar is not interested in disturbing the status quo, but some other members of his group are -- especially Sheik al-Zindani, who in the wake of the elections was appointed to the five man presidential council.

As Yemen moved closer to a civil war, Zindani played an important role. He worked in various positions in Yemen's past, including, crucially, the minister of education. But it wasn't until the war with the Soviet Union in Afghanistan that he really found his legs. He was a key recruiter in Yemen, which sent more soldiers than any other country besides Saudi Arabia. It was also there that he met Osama bin Laden and, according to reports, became his mentor. After returning from Afghanistan, Zindani became the leader of Islah's radical faction, and continued as a mentor to the "Afghan Arabs." He is known for his fiery taped sermons, which, among other topics, blame U.S. President George W. Bush and Jews in general for the September 11 attacks on New York and Washington, and was accused of using his fighters to kill southern leaders in the period between unification and civil war.

The Yemeni civil war began in 1994 and was widely expected to be a stalemate. But Zindani rallied his "Afghans" to fight on behalf of the North. While doing so they preached their Wahabbi-influenced version of Islam to the northern army. Saudi Arabia was, paradoxically, the south's biggest supporter, but could rally few states beside Sudan, Libya, and the universally unrecognized Somaliland to its cause. Needless to say, the world community failed to flock to this coalition. The North eventually won, and Saleh's position was secure.

But his security was not of the no-strings-attached variety. The radical faction was allowed to muscle their ideas into the south, destroying, among other things, Yemen's only brewery. Saleh was indebted to both Islah, for supporting him despite Saudi objections, and to Hashid tribesmen for their fighting. He left the north mostly untouched by the central government and allowed fundamental social reconstruction of the south to go unchecked.

Corruption remained rampant, and the economy continued to plummet following the disproportionate ruin wrought by an "Arab Solution" stance that was perceived as pro-Iraqi in 1990-91. Still, Yemen remained the Arab world's closest approximation to a democracy, with a lively press and dozens of functioning, if largely ineffective, opposition parties.

Yemen as a World Player

After September 11, the U.S. looked at Yemen as possibly another Afghanistan that might have to be invaded to root out militants. Saleh quickly offered his help, avoiding invasion. The militants in his country were a danger to him, especially as his economy continued to dive and the population was getting younger without chance of employment. Saleh realized that he could have U.S. military help to fight his battles and also have a chance to change Yemen's image from a hotbed of Islamic militancy to an active fighter in the "war on terrorism." This move was also expected to improve Yemen's dire economic straits.

Saleh's will is not supreme. His main challenge remains not being seen as a U.S. lackey, not an easy task when his primary ally is an administration eager to show its muscle. When a C.I.A. drone killed six suspected al-Qaeda members, including the organization's man in Yemen, Qaed Salim Sinan al-Harethi, the agreed-upon story was supposed to be that the militants were destroyed by their own bomb. Washington quickly revealed its role, much to Saleh's embarrassment and to general uproar in Yemen. This led to his refusal to turn over al-Harethi's replacement when he was caught.

But Yemen didn't stop its internal war, and the U.S. didn't stop turning to Yemen in its external one. U.S. Special Forces are in the country now training Yemeni anti-terrorist troops, who have stepped up both the quantity and quality of their operations. In early March they staged a large raid that netted several top militants, including a handful of Egyptian fugitives.

Nevertheless, everything is not stable. Northern tribesmen are helping Saleh, partly because Sheik al-Ahmar, who as head of the council of representatives controls the financial funds, is as afraid of messing with the status quo as Saleh. But the tribesmen are listening to appeals for Yemen's sake, as well as some distaste for Wahabbism, not because they are eager to help the United States. If the U.S. sends in more troops, or their perception of influence is overwhelming, the tribesmen could revolt.

This is where the case of Zindani comes in. It is nearly impossible for Saleh to turn Zindani over to U.S. courts, or -- even worse -- the U.S. military installation at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Yet to not do so will be in open defiance of the United States. There have been hints of cooperation. Abdul al-Ansi, deputy chairman of al-Islah, was quoted in the Yemen Times as saying "Does the United States have proof that supports the accusations? If it does have proof, it should give it to the Yemeni government." He indicated that Saleh's government would be more than happy to get rid of Zindani if there was any political cover.

But for the moment there is not. Saleh is not quite powerful enough to take on a popular figure simply because the Treasury Department has asked him to. Zindani may in fact be the most dangerous person in Yemen, but he is also the one man the government fears to go after. Saleh, who stepped up raids directly following the indictment, may be trying to send the U.S. a message that he is still on its side despite Zindani. Saleh is trapped in a dangerous game of appeasing both sides, a game whose rules are dictated by Yemen's difficult and confusing history. With Zindani now on America's Most Wanted List, the game has become considerably more treacherous.

Report Drafted By:
Brian O'Neill


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